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Who's Judging Whom? Why Popular
Elections are Preferable to Merit Selection
Systems
The Honorable Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr.*
I.

Introduction
Merit selection is merit politics!
Popular election of judges, however, is the most democratic,

representative, and efficient method of judicial selection. It is utilized by
* Judge Peter Paul Olszewski, Sr. is a Senior Judge on the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. Judge Olszewski graduated from Wyoming Seminary, Lafayette College,
and St. John's University School of Law. During World War II, Judge Olszewski served
with the United States Army in the China-Burma-India Theatre of Operations. He began
his legal career in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, where he practiced as a trial lawyer for
fifteen years. He was then elected to the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County,
where he served as a trial judge for sixteen years. He was elected to the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania in 1983.
Judge Olszewski recognizes the work of Matthew E. Dunham and Stephen Molitoris
on this article. Mr. Dunham is a graduate of the Penn State Dickinson School of Law and
was Judge Olszewski's law clerk from September 2003 to August 2004. During his
clerkship, Mr. Dunham made significant contributions to the research, writing, and
editing of this article. Mr. Molitoris graduated from Villanova Law School in May 2004.
During a summer internship with Judge Olszewski, Mr. Molitoris gathered research and
collaborated with Judge Olszewski on the first draft of this article.
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the majority of states and should be adopted by those states that currently
appoint judges. Popular elections provide the most democratic form of
judicial selection because they give citizens a direct role in choosing the
judges that represent them. When judges are appointed by a selection
committee or by a governor, however, the citizenry is deprived of their
fundamental right to vote and select judges. The election system is not
without its flaws, but such imperfections can be remedied. In contrast,
the weaknesses of the so-called merit selection system are not easily
resolved.
Part II of this article provides a general history of judicial selection
in the United States, and specifically, in Pennsylvania. Part III focuses
on why popular elections are preferable to merit selection methods of
choosing judges. This section, while dispelling several false claims
made by merit selection advocates, argues that popular election of judges
is the most democratic approach to choosing a judiciary. This article
maintains that voters are capable of making informed decisions when
choosing judicial candidates, and that popularly elected judges remain
independent and impartial. Part IV acknowledges that there are some
areas in which the judicial election system can improve, and goes on to
outline several means for improving the system's virtues. Finally, Part V
concludes this article.
II.
A.

Historical Overview of Judicial Selection
General History of JudicialSelection

The controversy surrounding judicial selection began as a separation
of powers struggle between King Richard II of England and the British
Parliament. In 1387, the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, Tresillian,
was hanged after Parliament impeached him for advising Richard 1I that
a parliamentary commission was invalid and traitorous because it
usurped powers relegated to the monarch.' This event highlighted the
debate over who controlled judicial selection, a controversy that
continued through 1701, when the Act of Settlement granted judges
tenure during good behavior, and authorized judicial removal only upon
a vote of both Houses of Parliament.2
The judicial selection dilemma then carried over into the colonies,
where King George III retained absolute control over selection,
1. The Honourable Lord Justice Brooke, Judicial Independence: Its History in
England and Wales, available at http://www.jc.nsw.gov.au/fb/fbbrook.htm (last visited
April 5, 2004).
2. Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to Judicial
Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 369 (2002).
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appointment, and removal of judges.3 Thomas Jefferson assailed the
English judicial system, noting that
the wretched criminal, if he happened to have offended on the
American side, stripped of his privilege of trial by peers, of his
vicinage, removed from the place where alone full evidence could be
obtained without money, without counsel, without friends, without
4
exculpatory proof, is tried before judges predetermined to condemn.
As the Revolutionary War approached, American colonists took
issue with apparent inconsistencies in judicial tenure among colonial
judges. The colonists sought to wrestle control of the judiciary away
from the King.5 Parliament decided to pay colonial judicial salaries from
taxes levied on commodities imported to America, exasperating the
colonists. 6 Disenchanted with the lack of access to a fair legal system,
the colonists included their judicial tenure and salary grievances in the
Declaration of Independence, stating that the King "has made judges
dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices and the amount
and payment of their salaries."7
After the Revolutionary War was fought and won by the colonial
Americans, newly formed states balked at the selection of judges by a
single individual, as had been done in England.8 Eight states established
appointment by the legislature, while the remaining five required
legislative approval of appointees. 9 Further, while constructing the
United States' federal court system, the constitutional framers relied
heavily on the writings of Charles de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu
and William Blackstone, both of whom saw an independent judiciary as
an integral part of democratic society. 10 Montesquieu, in particular,
stressed the need for the popular election of judges.1" It is thus clear that
from the birth of our nation, the election of judges embodied the system
of checks and balances required by state governments and the U.S.
Constitution.
In 1812, Georgia went beyond simply granting the legislature the
right to select judges, becoming the first state to adopt popular elections
3.

Kelley Armitage, Denial Ain't Just a River in Egypt: A Thorough Review of

JudicialElections, Merit Selection and the Role of State Judges in Society, 29 CAP. U. L.
REv. 625, 628 (2002).
4. THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 13 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Penguin Books

1975).
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11

Muniz, supra note 2, at 369.
Id.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,

Armitage, supra note 3, at 629.
Id.
Muniz, supra note 2, at 370.
Id

para. 11 (U.S. 1776).
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as a means of choosing judges.' 2 Mississippi followed suit in 1832, and
number of
by the height of Andrew Jackson's presidency, an increasing
13
states had turned judicial selection over to the people.
After the Civil War, however, one party began to dominate the
political process through mechanisms such as patronage politics and
political machines, leading some states to seek alternative methods of
judicial selection. 14 In 1934, California established a commission to
select judges, and in 1940, Missouri organized a panel of legal and nonlegal representatives to nominate three candidates from whom the
governor would chose one. 15 Under the Missouri scheme, each judge
would face a retention election after serving an initial term on the
bench. 16 Eventually, this method of choosing judges became known as
the Missouri Plan, and in the years that followed, nineteen other states
adopted it in some form.' 7 Despite this trend, however, twenty-one states
retained the election system, and ten states utilized some combination of
the two. 18

In summary,
[e]lecting judges was an idea of nineteenth century Americans who
believed in the right of self-government and who sought to protect
their judges from domination by sordid politicians. Merit selection of
judges, subject to periodic retention elections, was an idea of early
twentieth century Americans who believed that law is a science or an
arcane technology
unrelated to politics and properly entrusted to
9
experts.'

B. History ofJudicialSelection in Pennsylvania
Article V, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution establishes
the method of judicial selection in the Commonwealth. It provides,
"[j]ustices, judges and justices of the peace shall be elected at the
municipal election next preceding the commencement of their respective
terms of office by the electors of the
Commonwealth or the respective
20
districts in which they are to serve.,
12.

Armitage, supra note 3, at 629.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 629-30.
Id. at 631-32.
Id.
Id. at 632-33.
Id.

18. The American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection Methods in the States,
availableat http://ajs.org/selection/sel-state-select-map.asp (last visited April 26, 2004).
19. Paul D. Carrington & Adam Long, Symposium: Selecting Pennsylvania Judges
in the Twenty-First Century, 106 DICK. L. REv. 747, 747 (Spring 2002).
20. PA. CONST. Art. V, Sec. 13(a).
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The method for choosing the judiciary, however, has changed many
times throughout Pennsylvania's history. In 1776, Pennsylvania's first
Constitution provided for judges to serve seven-year terms after being
appointed by the president (i.e. governor) of Pennsylvania and a quorum
of the twelve-member Executive Council.21 In the Constitution of 1790,
power shifted and the governor was given the authority to appoint judges
for life. 22 By 1838, following growing sentiment seeking to hold all
governmental actors accountable to the voters, the tenure of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices was reduced from life to fifteen
years.23 Finally, in 1850, after passage by the legislature, the voters
adopted a Constitutional amendment for the popular, partisan election of
all judges.24
And yet, controversy over whether judges should be elected or
appointed arose again at the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention. 5
There, advocates of merit selection proposed a constitutional amendment
providing for an appointment system.26 The measure was submitted to
voters in the 1969 primary election, but Pennsylvanians voted down the
proposed amendment, deciding that they were capable of electing their
own judges.27
More recently in 1988, the Governor's Judicial Reform
Commission, popularly known as the Beck Commission, a blue ribbon
committee established by Governor Casey, recommended a
constitutional amendment that would provide for a mixed system of
judicial election and appointment. 28 Notably, there was a strong
dissenting statement in the Commission's report, 29 and no such
amendment was, or has been, forthcoming. In fact, legislative attempts
to modify Pennsylvania's system continually fail, and citizens of the
Commonwealth repeatedly oppose modifications to the direct election of

21. PA. CONST. Sec. 20; Sec. 23 (1776). A quorum of the Executive Counsel was
achieved by the presence of five members. Id.
22.

PA. CONST. Art. II, Sec. 8; Art. V, Sec. 4 (1790).

23. Ellen Mattleman Kaplan, Pennsylvaniansfor Modern Courts, Blueprint for the
Future of Judicial Election Reform, Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, available at
http://www.pmconline.org/blue/blue-Main.htm (July 1999).
24. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Pennsylvania,
available at http://www.ajs.org/js/PA-history.htm (last visited April 27, 2004).
25. Ellen Mattleman Kaplan, Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, Blueprintfor the
Future of Judicial Election Reform, Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, available at
http://www.pmconline.org/blue/blueMain.htm (July 1999).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S JUDICIAL REFORM COMMISSION, Phyllis W. Beck,
Chairperson (January 1988).

29.

id. at 202.
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the judiciary.3 °
As stated above, voters elect all judges on Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court, Superior Court, Commonwealth Court, and Courts of Common
Pleas. 3' Judicial candidates run in partisan elections, and the winning
candidate is elected to a ten year term of office.32 At the end of that ten
year term, judges wishing to retain their position can run in a retention
election. 33 Retention elections differ from re-elections because judges
seeking second terms do not face challengers, whereas in general reelections judges may have to compete with other candidates.34 In
retention elections, voters simply decide whether they want to retain or
remove the judge from the bench. If a majority of voters choose not to
retain a judge, a vacancy is created that will be filled by gubernatorial
appointment. 35 Otherwise, the retained judge will serve another ten year
term.36

Popular Election of Judges is Preferable to Merit Selection

III.
A.

A Comparison: Election v. Merit Selection

Clearly, election and merit selection systems employ different
means for choosing judges. There are, however, variances within merit
and election systems. Furthermore, not all states use pure elections or
merit selection to choose their judges; they use some combination of the
two.
In states that use the election system to select judges, the general
population votes for their preferred candidate, and the winner serves for a
period of years. Currently, there are twenty-one states that exclusively
use popular elections to select judges. 37 Of these twenty-one states, eight
employ partisan elections, twelve employ non-partisan elections, and one
utilizes a combination of partisan and non-partisan elections. 38 Ten other
30. Id. During the 1989-1990 session of the General Assembly, two merit selection
bills (SB 594 and HB 941) were introduced and defeated. American Judicature Society,
Judicial Selection in the States: Pennsylvania, available at http://www.ajs.org/
js/PA-history.htm (last visited April 27, 2004).
31.
PA. CONST. Art. V, Sec. 13.

32.
33.
34.
35.

See 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 3152.
See 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 3153.
Id.
Id.

36.

Id.

37. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Initial Selection,
Retention, and Term Length, January 2004, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/
SelectionRetentionTerms.pdf (last visited April 28, 2004).
38. Id. (States that exclusively use partisan elections include: Alabama, Illinois,
Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. Id. States that exclusively use
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states utilize popular elections to elect part of their judiciary.39 Of the
thirty-one states that use elections to select all or some of their judges,

twenty-nine states require the judge to stand for reelection after serving
their initial term, while two states hold retention elections.40
The merit selection system also varies from state to state. Some
states use a nominating commission to propose candidates for the

governor or legislature to select, while others allow the governor or
legislature to select judges directly.4 1

Selection committee panels may

include the governor, attorney general, state supreme court justices, bar
association officers, senate members, and private citizens. 42 After an
initial term in office, appointed judges may face retention elections or
they may be re-appointed by a commission, governor, or legislature.4 3
There is much debate about the virtues and deficiencies of both of

these systems.44 Some of the major issues facing judicial selection are
outlined below. When the two systems are compared, it is clear that the
popular election of judges is a superior method ofjudicial selection.
B.

An Independent Judiciary

The popular election of judges is the most democratic form of
judicial selection.4 5 Merit selection advocates, however, boast that an
appointment process provides an independent and more highly qualified
non-partisan elections include: Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin. Id. Michigan utilizes partisan elections to elect its Supreme Court, but uses
non-partisan elections to elect its Court of Appeals and Circuit Courts).
39. Id. (These states include: Arizona (Superior Courts in counties with populations
under 250,000); California (Superior Courts); Florida (Circuit Courts); Indiana (various
Circuit and Superior Courts); Kansas (Fourteen [of thirty-one] District Courts); Missouri
(Circuit Courts except in five counties); New York (Supreme Courts and County Courts);
Oklahoma (District Courts); South Dakota (Circuit Courts); and Tennessee (Chancery
Courts, Criminal Courts, and Circuit Courts)).
40. Id. (Sixteen other states also hold retention elections, but the retention elections
in those states are for judges who were appointed to the bench through the merit selection
system).
41. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Judicial Selection
White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/judicialelection.htm (last visited 4/278/2004).
42. Malia Reddick, Symposium: Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific
Literature, 106 DICK. L. REV. 729, 730-33 (2002), citing RICHARD A. WATSON & RANDAL
G. DowNfNG, THE POLITICS OF BENCH AND BAR (1969).

43. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Initial Selection,
Retention, and Term Length, January 2004, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/
SelectionRetentionTerms.pdf (last visited April 28, 2004).
44. See, e.g., Symposium: Selecting Judges in Pennsylvania, 106 DICK. L. REv. 679
(Spring 2002); Symposium on JudicialElections, 30 CAP. U.L. REV. 437 (2002).
45. See Reddick, supra note 42, at 729; Julius Uehlein & David H. Wilderman, Esq.,
Why Merit Selection Is Inconsistent with Democracy, 106 DICK. L. REV. 769 (2002).
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judiciary than can be attainable through the popular election of judges.46
This assertion is false.47
Notably, the merit selection system often requires the governor or
the legislature to appoint or give final approval for a judicial candidate.48
Undeniably, governors and legislators are influenced by politics. Even in
systems where judicial candidates are chosen by a nominating
commission, politics still play a significant role in the nomination
process, albeit in a less public forum.49
In merit selection systems, which generally use nominating
commissions, it is likely that selection committee members will attain
their post through some political process. 50 Richard A. Watson and
Randal G. Downing have studied the effects of twenty-five years of merit
selection in Missouri. 51 They found that "political influences were
present in the selection of both lawyer and lay commissioners., 52 In the
appointment of lay commissioners, Watson and Downing found that the
commissioners were likely to be from the same political party as the
governor.5 3 Moreover,
[i]n the process of selecting lawyer members of the nominating
commissions, attorneys tended to split into two groups [plaintiffs'
46. American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best
Judges, available at www.ajs.org/selection/ms-descrip.pdf (last visited Dec. 22, 2003);
see also Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, Merit Selection: Commission-Based
Appointments, available at http://www.pmconline.org/merintro.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
47.

See Reddick, supra note 42, at 744 (analyzing social scientific research on the

merit selection system and concluding that merit selection does not make judges more
independent or accountable to the public).
48. J. Andrew Crompton, Pennsylvanian's Should Adopt a Merit Selection System
for State Appellate Court Judges, 106 DICK. L. REv. 755, 763 (2002) (describing the
merit selection process and stating that the Governor makes the final selection of judges
from a list comprised by a nominating commission); see also Pennsylvanians for Modem
Courts,
Merit Selection: Commission-Based Appointments,
available at
http://www.pmconline.org/merintro.htm (last visited October 8, 2003). Governors also
directly appoint judges in California, Maine, New Hampshire, and New Jersey.
American Judicature Society, JudicialSelection in the States: InitialSelection, Retention,
and
Term
Length,
January
2004,
available at http://www.ajs.org/js/
SelectionRetentionTerms.pdf (last visited April 28, 2004). Legislatures appoint judges in
South Carolina and Virginia. Id.
49. See infra, notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
50. Reddick, supra note 42, at 732-34.
51. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Judicial Selection
White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/judicialelection.htm, (last visited 1/8/2004). The
authors of this article cite to: RICHARD A. WATSON & RANDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS
OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR (1969). Id.
52. Reddick, supra note 42, at 732 (citing RICHARD A. WATSON & RANDAL G.
DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF BENCH AND BAR (1969)).
53. Id.
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lawyers and defense lawyers], much in the manner of a traditional
two-party system. Far from bringing more []professional values to
bear on the selection process, the attorneys tended to focus on more
tangible selection
criteria, in particular the socioeconomic interests of
54
their clients.
Accordingly, the goal of the Missouri Plan to take politics out of the
judicial selection process has backfired. In practice, the Missouri Plan
replaced the usual open politics associated with general elections with
the closed-door politics of bar associations and executive appointments,
in which the general population has no voice.55
Further, a recent article by Dr. Malia Reddick 56 claims that politics
play a large role, not only in the selection of committee members, but
also in the commission's deliberation process.57 She cites two studies
which reveal that one-third to one-half of commissioners interviewed
stated that political considerations were introduced in deliberations, and
that such considerations influenced their choices for judicial
nominations.5 8 Citing the Watson and Downing study, Dr. Reddick
reveals that commission members use "panel stacking" and "logrolling"
tactics to choose judicial candidates. 59 "Panel stacking" is when a
nominating commission's list of nominees is fixed so that there is no real
choice for the appointing authority to make. 60 "Logrolling" occurs when
individual commission members cut deals with other commission
members to support their respective nominees.61
Judgeships are political positions. Most scholars recognize that the
law is synonymous with politics and that judges make political choices
when they make decisions.62 Research has shown that "the Missouri
Plan substitutes committee politics for electoral politics. The appearance
of expertise and non-partisanship is largely, if not entirely, a faqade. 63
Given the role judges play in politics, should not the citizenry be entitled
to vote for their preferred candidate?

54. Id.
55. Id.
56.

Reddick, supra note 42, at 733 (Dr. Reddick is the Director of Research for the

American Judicature Society).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Armitage, supra note 3, at 638, (quoting Peter D. Webster, Selection and
Retention of Judges: Is there One "Best" Method?, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995)).
63. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Judicial Selection
White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/judicialelection.htm, (last visited 1/8/2004).

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 109:1

C. An ImpartialJudiciary
Citizens who elect judges on the basis of the information gained
from that candidate's campaign can expect those judges to remain
impartial after they are elected. Under the Pennsylvania Code of Judicial
Conduct, a candidate is prohibited from making "statements that commit
or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or
issues that are likely to come before the court. '64 Although merit
selection proponents claim that judicial candidates compromise their
impartiality and independence by taking positions on issues to which
they must be neutral when on the bench,65 the United States Supreme
Court disagrees. 66 A candidate that announces his or her views on
particular issues is not bound to maintain that position after the
election. 67 "We know that 'announcing... views' on an issue
covers
68
much more than promising to decide an issue a particular way."
It is difficult to see the dichotomy that merit selection proponents
are intent on drawing between merit selection and judicial elections with
respect to judicial independence and impartiality.
Merit selection
advocates claim that selection committees would consider judicial
nominees based on their experience, training, leadership, scholarship,
public service, and temperament. 69 If the members of the nominating
committee are looking at these factors, the potential judicial nominee's
politics will surely shine through. A judicial nominee's personal politics
are thus important to their nomination and approval. To confirm this
proposition, one needs only to watch C-SPAN during a judicial
confirmation hearing.
Admittedly, politics cannot be removed from judicial selection
regardless of the process used to choose judicial candidates.
Nevertheless, the flaws in the election system are eclipsed by the
injustices of the so-called merit selection system.
Moreover, the
problems in the election system can be remedied. 7"

64.
65.

PA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 7(B)(1)(c) (2003).
Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Merit Selection: Commission-Based

Appointments, available at http://www.pmconline.org/merintro.htm (last visited October
8, 2003).
66. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781-82 (2002).

67. Id. at 770.
68. Id.
69. Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, Merit Selection: Commission-Based
Appointments, available at http://www.pmconline.org/merintro.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).

70.

See infra, Part IV.

2004]

WHO'S JUDGING WHOM?

D. A Qualified Judiciary
Merit selection advocates argue further that the merit selection
process is more democratic than election systems because selection
committees can make informed choices based on reliable rational
research and thorough information, whereas in a popular election, voters
are destined to make uninformed and unqualified decisions. 7 1 The claim
is that judicial candidates are limited to statements like, "I believe in law
and order" when campaigning, 72 and therefore, voters are not capable of
gaining real information about a candidate from their campaigns. This is
erroneous. Voters are no less informed in judicial races than they are in
legislative or executive election races.
Moreover, voters have the capacity to make intelligent and informed
decisions in judicial races, as they have increased access to a variety of
media outlets, including: newspapers, television, radio, and the internet.
Furthermore, judicial candidates are not confined to generic statements to
bolster their positions. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,7 3 the
United States Supreme Court held that judicial candidates may voice
their opinions on issues of political and legal dispute.74 Newly elected
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice, Max Baer, took full advantage of
this ruling in his 2003 campaign. While campaigning, Baer voiced his
opinion on abortion, tort reform, the death penalty, gun control, and labor
unions. 75 During the campaign, Baer and his opponent, Joan Orie
Melvin, ran two million dollars worth of advertisements on television.76
Notably, Melvin chose not to voice her opinions on legal and political
issues.77 In the end, voters chose the candidate with whom they were
more informed and whose stated politics reflected their own.
Merit selection proponents cannot show that nominating
commissions appoint more qualified judges than those elected by the

71. American Judicature Society, Merit Selection: The Best Way to Choose the Best
Judges, available at www.ajs.org/selection/ms -descrip.pdf (last visited December 22,
2003); see also Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, Merit Selection: commission-Based
Appointments, available at http://www.pmconline.org/merintro.htm (last visited October
8, 2003).
72. Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, Merit Selection: Commission-Based
Appointments, available at http://www.pmconline.org/merintro.htm (last visited Oct. 8,
2003).
73. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
74. White, 536 U.S. at 788 (stating that "[t]he Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of
judicial conduct prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announcing their views
on disputed legal and political issues violates the First Amendment").
75. Emily Heller, He Speaks on Issues, Wins State Court Seat; The Election Tested
the New Right to Take Stands, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 2003, at 7.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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people. 78 Not only are appointed judges just as likely to have political
careers as elected judges, but studies have shown that there are relatively
no differences in qualifications between appointed and elected judges.79
After researching the qualifications of judges chosen under the Missouri
Plan, political scientist Harry Stumpf found no support for claims that
merit selection candidates were better educated than elected judges, more
open-minded than elected judges, or had more judicial experience than
elected judges.80 Accordingly, if merit selection does not produce judges
more qualified than those elected by the people, why would a democratic
society remove the citizen's role?
IV.

Improving the Election System

This article does not suggest that the election system is flawless.
Like all popular election systems, a judicial election system will "not
[be] foolproof, nor [will] it [be] perfect... the democratic process by its
very nature, is anything but perfect." 8'
Campaign finance and
inequalities in the voting process are two of the primary concerns of the
Pennsylvania judicial election system. These problems, however, are
inherent in the democratic form of government and can be resolved
without shifting paradigms.
There is no need to resort to the
implementation of an entirely new mode of judicial selection.
A.

Campaign Finance

Campaigning is one area of the election system that has been
nationally criticized, particularly in relation to campaign finance and
political advertising.8 2 Reform in Pennsylvania and other states is
necessary.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002, also known as the McCain-Feingold
Bill. 3
The Court upheld statutory restrictions on soft money
contributions and limitations on political advertising. 4
78. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Judicial Selection
White Papers: The Case for PartisanJudicial Elections, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/udicialelection.htm, (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).
79. Reddick, supra note 42, at 741-42.

80.

Id.

81. The Honorable Judge John P. Hester, Testimony at Pennsylvania Senate Hearing
in Pittsburgh regarding a proposed Constitutional Amendment to establish a merit
selection system (transcript on file with author).
82. The Reform Institute for Campaign and Election Issues, Reform for Judicial
Elections & Selection, available at http://reforminstitute.org/cgi-data/issues/files/2.shtml
(last visited April 30, 2004).
83. 2 U.S.C. § 431 (2002).
84. McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619, 718-19 (2003).
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The constitutionality of the reform provisions in the McCainFeingold Bill stands as a testament to the possibilities of reform.
Pennsylvania's legislature, along with the other state legislatures, should
consider similar legislation to reform judicial elections. These reform
measures are easily implemented and would significantly help to remove
the conflict which exists where judicial campaigns receive contributions
from the same people, parties and attorneys, who later appear before
them.
Campaign financing for judicial elections should also provide that
monetary contributions be channeled through a state bar association,
which would have the responsibility of distributing the money equally to
each candidate. In addition, Pennsylvania should consider creating a
general campaign fund for judicial elections that would be similar to the
one used in presidential election campaigns.
B.

The Voting Process

The voting process is another aspect of the election system in need
of repair. The 2000 presidential election exposed flaws in voting
systems across the country, and these problems apply with equal force to
the election of judges at the state level. In Pennsylvania, judicial
elections are burdened with problems such as ballot position and name
recognition. Regional domination presents another weakness, as most
judges elected to the appellate bench in Pennsylvania come from the
greater Philadelphia and Pittsburgh regions. 5
These concerns, however, can be addressed.
Simultaneous
drawings for ballot positions in all counties, rotating positions in counties
across the state, and random drawings for ballot positions are some
possible solutions. The Election Code could also be amended to prevent
apathetic judicial candidates from playing "Judicial Roulette," where
candidates file for election in the hopes of getting a good ballot position,
only to withdraw if their position turns out to be poor. Further, regional
domination may be alleviated if a candidate's county of origin is not
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Pennsylvania's Appellate Judges, available at http://www.pmconline.org/appjudge.htm
(last visited April 30, 2004) (Allegheny County-2; Philadelphia County-2;
Montgomery County-1; Cumberland County-2). Thirteen of the fifteen judges on the
Pennsylvania Superior Court come from the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh regions. Id.
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indicated on the ballot. Such proposals can be adopted relatively easily
without a constitutional amendment and would effectively counter some
of the most vehement concerns of election system opponents.
V.
A.

Conclusion
JudicialElections Provide Balance to Government

Judicial elections give a democratic voice to the citizenry, thereby
fulfilling a fundamental tenet of democracy, the requirement of checksand-balances. Why should judicial selection differ from the selection
systems for the executive and legislative branches? As with presidential
and legislative elections, voters can bear responsibility for researching
the candidates who run for judicial seats and for voting conscientiously.
By doing so, judges, like other elected officials, become directly
accountable to the people. This form of accountability prevents one
branch from having too much influence on another. Without judicial
elections, there would be an imbalance among the three branches.
In an election system, the balance of power is maintained because
the judges "check" the legislature through their power to declare laws
unconstitutional.
Likewise, the legislature checks the judiciary by
establishing courts and passing laws. The executive, in turn, checks the
judiciary through oversight, while the judiciary checks the executive
through judicial interpretation. Most importantly, all branches are held
accountable by citizens who vote to elect the members of each branch.
This latter "check" on civic leaders is absent from the merit selection
approach.
Merit selection advocates argue that after an appointed judge has
served his term he may face a retention election, which would provide a
level of accountability to the public. Political science research, however,
indicates that appointed judges facing retention elections are re-elected at
a higher rate than judges elected in partisan elections 8 6 This is a result
of very low voter turnout for retention elections, the judge running
unopposed, and the judge not identifying with a particular party. 7
Accordingly, merit selection retention elections do not truly hold
appointed judges accountable to the populace. Partisan elections, in

86. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy' Studies, Judicial Selection
White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White%20Papers/judicialelection.htm, (last visited April 27, 2004);
see also Reddick, supra note 42, at 739-40.
87. The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies, Judicial Selection
White Papers: The Case for Partisan Judicial Elections, available at http://www.fedsoc.org/Publications/White / 20Papers/judicialelection.htm, (last visited April 27, 2004).
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which candidates compete for votes, provide more accountability
because the voters' choices are valuable. Their voices are much more
than a rubber stamp.
Unlike merit selection, a judicial election system offers a
democratic, representative, and efficient form of judicial selection. It
provides judicial accountability while maintaining independence and
impartiality. Without judicial elections, citizens are likely to become
disenchanted with the legal system because they are not directly
involved. At best, commissions can attempt to represent the wishes of
the people. At worst, commissions represent special interest groups and
are a means to pay political favors. Citizens are given no real choice.
B.

Closing Comments

Popular elections preserve the right of each eligible citizen to vote
for those who will serve him or her by applying the laws that govern all
citizens. The people's right to elect those by whom they are to be judged
is the "very touch-stone in the foundation of the democratic process. ' ' 8
The judicial election system maintains these long-cherished principles by
holding the state judges responsible to the people of the state, providing
judicial accountability, neutrality, and independence.
This article has shown that the arguments advanced by merit
selection proponents are thin. Merit selection does not offer greater
accountability, as judges are rarely removed in low-voter-turnout
retention elections. Merit selection does not allow for more neutral
judges, as the election process safeguards against conflicts of interest.
Also, merit selection does not provide for greater judicial independence,
as judges are chosen based on political motivations.
In an election system, politics play a role, but the political influence
originates with the people. This is the very definition of democracy.
Merit selection advocates seek to remove social responsibility from
citizens by placing it in the hands of the few. Their position is
reminiscent of an aristocracy. Therefore, judges should be chosen by
voters in a popular election.
Finally, I am aware that the Pennsylvania Bar Association (PBA)
favors a merit selection system. 89 Its support for such a system, however,
is advocated by the leadership of the association and not by its
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membership. 90 The PBA should take the temperature of its entire
membership concerning this important issue through secret ballot. This
paper demonstrates that only through democratic methods can the will of
the people be heard.
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